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Abstract
In post-publication peer review, scientific contributions are first published
in open-access forums, such as arXiv or other digital libraries, and are sub-
sequently reviewed and possibly ranked and/or evaluated. Compared to the
classical process of scientific publishing, in which review precedes publica-
tion, post-publication peer review leads to faster dissemination of ideas, and
publicly-available reviews. The chief concern in post-publication reviewing
consists in eliciting high-quality, insightful reviews from participants.
We describe the mathematical foundations and structure of TrueReview,
an open-source tool we propose to build in support of post-publication re-
view. In TrueReview, the motivation to review is provided via an incentive
system that promotes reviews and evaluations that are both truthful (they turn
out to be correct in the long run) and informative (they provide significant
new information). TrueReview organizes papers in venues, allowing differ-
ent scientific communities to set their own submission and review policies.
These venues can be manually set-up, or they can correspond to categories in
well-known repositories such as arXiv. The review incentives can be used to
form a reviewer ranking that can be prominently displayed alongside papers
in the various disciplines, thus offering a concrete benefit to reviewers. The
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paper evaluations, in turn, reward the authors of the most significant papers,
both via an explicit paper ranking, and via increased visibility in search.
1 Introduction
Peer review has not always preceded publication. In the times of Galileo, Newton,
van Leeuwenhoek, up to Darwin, scientists would share their results via letters or
presentations to scientific societies; the results were then discussed among scien-
tists. The current system of pre-publication peer review was widely adopted only
relatively recently, starting in the 1940s with the introduction of large-circulation
scientific journals [Spi02]. Pre-publication peer review was shaped by the eco-
nomics of paper journal publishing: as paper journals are slow and expensive to
print and ship, peer-review was used to select which articles deserved wide dis-
semination.
The economics of publishing is very different now. Information nowadays can
be disseminated immediately at very low cost, and furthermore, in a manner that
makes it open to social interaction: in blogs, wikis, forums, social networks, and
other venues, people can both share and comment on information. Yet, for the
most part the scientific community still beholds pre-publication peer review as the
officially anointed method of disseminating results. Publication in venues such as
journals and conferences with a pre-publication peer-review selection process is
also the most commonly used measure of scientific productivity, and contributes to
shape the near totality of academic and research careers.
Pre-publication peer review has several drawbacks. One of the most salient is
the delay imposed on the dissemination of results. In a typical computer science
conference, six months may elapse from submission to publication in the proceed-
ings, and this assumes that the conference deadline came just when the paper was
ready for submission, and more importantly, that the paper was accepted. To avoid
this delay, many authors submit the paper to open repositories such as arXiv1 at the
same time as they submit it to a conference or journal. While this makes it available
to other researchers, a submission to ArXiv does not come with the all-important
blessing of peer review. As such, papers submitted to arXiv are not generally
counted as part of the productivity record of researchers. Submitting to arXiv is
not an alternative for submissions to conferences or journals with double-blind re-
view policies, and citing works submitted in arXiv, but not yet peer-reviewed, is
not universally perceived as appropriate in science.
A related issue is the one of selection. The current process of scientific re-
viewing, consequently, aims at deciding which papers to accept for publication,
1http://arxiv.org/
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and which to reject. Correctness is only one factor in such a decision: commonly,
there are many more correct submissions (in the sense of exempt from scientific
errors) than can be accepted, and the decision to accept or reject is motivated by
judgements on the significance of the submissions. The paper acceptance process
is thus of necessity an uncertain process, where a demarcation line needs to be
drawn among papers of fairly similar apparent significance. Papers that present
correct results, but which do not make the cut, are subjected to a delay as they are
re-submitted to different journals of conferences. The process is slow and wasteful
of resources.
One last drawback of pre-publication peer review is that papers are not pre-
sented to readers in the context of the accumulated knowledge and judgement.
While this shields papers from being presented alongside potentially irrelevant re-
views, this also means that insightful observations from readers and researchers
cannot help understand papers and put them in context.
This white paper presents the design principles and mathematical foundations
of TrueReview, an open-source system we propose to build in support of post-
publication peer-review. In the next section, we describe the overall motivations
and design principles that inspire the development of TrueReview. After a review
of related work, we discuss the problem of motivating reviewers, and we describe
in Section 4 the reviewer incentive system at the heart of TrueReview. The main
challenge in a review system consists in ensuring that all papers receive sufficient
and precise evaluations. Our novel incentive scheme promotes reviews that are
both truthful and informative, in the sense that they bring novel information into
the system rather than merely confirming what is already known. To validate the
proposed incentive scheme, we report in Section 5 the result of simulations of the
review process with participants having a varying distribution of skills and paper
topic expertise. The simulations show that the incentive system is effective in en-
suring that all papers receive precise evaluations. We conclude with an overview
of the software architecture of TrueReview, and a discussion of some key imple-
mentation decisions.
All the code for TrueReview is open source, and it can be found at https:
//github.com/TrueReview/TrueReview.
2 TrueReview Design Principles
TrueReview will be an open, on-line system, where authors can publish their pa-
pers or enter links to their papers, and where reviewers can review and evaluate the
papers after they have been published. This would serve the scientific community
as a whole, by making the dissemination of results more open, predictable and less
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subject to delays, and by helping researchers view papers in light of the accumu-
lated knowledge and wisdom. At the core of TrueReview are the following design
principles.
Driven by scientific communities. TrueReview does not plan to be a one-size-
fits-all solution for post-publication review. Papers published or linked in TrueRe-
view will not be all put into the same “pot” for review and ranking. Each scientific
community has norms for the format of published papers, and has well-known re-
searchers that act as standard-bearers for the community: these are the people that
today serve on the journal editorial boards and conference program committees.
Each community that elects to use TrueReview will decide whether papers are to
be submitted to TrueReview directly, or whether TrueReview tracks paper submit-
ted to certain categories in open-access repositories such as Arxiv. The choice of
who can review papers in a venue will also be left to each community. In some
venues, the senior members might wish to approve who has review priviledge, or
adopt an invitation system. For other venues, such as venues that correspond to
Arxiv categories, it might be sufficient to have published a paper in the same venue
to be able to review.
No delays to publication. While papers that have just been submitted are unre-
viewed, this should not prevent their circulation. One natural objection is whether
making papers available immediately deprives readers from the quality guarantee
conferred by a formal process of paper review. We believe that the benefits of the
prompt communication of scientific results far outweigh the drawback of circulat-
ing papers in various stages of review. The status of a peer reviewed paper is often
assumed by people not familiar with the process to be a seal of approval that guar-
antees the correctness of the results. In reality, errors in scientific papers are not
always discovered by the conference or journal review committees to which the
papers are submitted: more often, the errors are discovered by the authors them-
selves, or by people who try to use or extend the papers results. Only papers that
are widely read, and whose results are extensively used, can be trusted to be highly
likely to be correct.
Rank rather than select. When a paper is submitted to a journal or conference,
the question of whether to accept or reject it most often revolves on the relevance of
the paper, rather than on its correctness. After the papers that are clearly flawed are
eliminated, there are invariably too many papers to fit in the conference or journal
format; the committee must then select the papers to accept on the basis of their
quality. The committee thus essentially performs a ranking task, applying then
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a binary threshold dictated by conference or journal constraints. For the rejected
papers that were indeed correct, this process results in a pointless delay to publi-
cation; as these are typically resubmitted to other venues, the work that went into
ranking them is also wasted.
This summary of the current review process is greatly simplified. In truth, there
are many conferences and journals, with different typical quality levels, and authors
choose the venue where to submit the paper in order to compromise between the
prestige of the venue, and the probability that the paper is accepted. Nevertheless,
the process is wasteful of time and work. We believe it would be better to use
the reviews and comments for ranking, rather than for selection. There would be
no need to artificially set a cut-off line; all papers would be ranked and available
on-line as soon as the authors publish them.
Once a ranking of the papers were available (even if approximate), journals
and conferences could use the ranking for selection purposes. For example, a con-
ference could gather people interested in a particular field, and allocate paper pre-
sentation slots to the 30 highest-ranked papers of the year, and poster presentation
space to the next 50 highest-ranked; a journal or book editor could similarly pub-
lish (and distribute to libraries in archival form) the best 50 papers of each year.
Certainly many users of the system could use the ranking for selection purposes,
but the main goal of the system would be to generate a ranking, not a selection.
Truthful and informative incentives to review. The main obstacle to post-
publication review consists in enlisting expert reviewers, and having them provide
accurate ratings and reviews on most papers in a venue. In conference and journals,
the enticement to review is provided by the prestige of appearing on the program
committee or editorial board of a well known journal or conference. Reviewers
need to provide competent reviews, or risk appearing uninformed when their re-
views are compared with those of others on the program committee or editorial
board. In exchange for being listed as members of the program committee or ed-
itorial board, the reviewers also accept to read and review papers that they would
not have read out of their interest alone.
We plan to recreate the incentive to review by also giving wide publicity to
the most active reviewers, and by attributing merit for the reviews via an incentive
system that prizes reviews that both are correct, and provide new information. In
each venue, the names of the reviewers that accrued highest review merit will be
displayed in the first page, alongside the top-rated papers. Reviewers will be able
to link their name to a web page of their choice, such as their academic home page.
We hope this visibility and mark of distinction, which mirrors the one currently
offered by membership in program committees and editorial boards, will provide
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sufficient motivation to actively participate in the system.
The incentive system for reviews will reward reviewers who provide rating that
are both truthful and informative. Truthful ratings are those that will be confirmed
later on by the consensus opinion on a paper. Informative ratings are those that
provide genuinely new information. Examples of informative ratings are the first
rating for a previously unreviewed paper, or a rating that differs from the current
consensus for a paper, but will be later confirmed to be correct. In contrast, a rating
and review that reflects the consensus on a paper that has already been reviewed
many times will have low informative value. Considering both truthfulness and in-
formativeness to reward reviewers encourages them to focus where their expertise
allows them to give new useful information. This combined incentive should also
lead to prompt rating of papers published in venues.
Additionally, for venues with a long life-span (such as venues replicating arXiv
categories), users can be encouraged to periodically contribute new reviews by
slowly decreasing their accrued score, as long as they do not provide a new review.
3 Related Work
A detailed proposal for a post-publication peer-review model was made by
Kriegeskorte [Kri12]. The author advocates signed reviews and multi-dimensional
paper evaluations, that can be aggregated by different interested parties in differ-
ent ways. The dissemination of signed reviews is deemed a sufficient incentive
for reviewers to participate in the process. The paper contains also an in-depth
analysis of the benefits of post-publication peer review, which are presented in an
eloquent way and which are indeed part of the motivation for this study on in-
centives. The incentive schemes we propose do not require review authors to be
publicly visible. This may be beneficial, as there is some evidence that signed
reviews may deter prospective reviewers, or dampen the frankness of their opin-
ions [VRGE+99, vRDE10]. The virtues, and drawbacks, of signed reviews have
been described in [Gro10, Kha10]; signed reviews can prevent the abuse of review
power, but they also can stifle criticism.
The proposal for TrueReview shares its fundamental motivations with
[DSdA11], of which it represents an evolution, as well as with [Kri12], while dif-
fering in the details of the incentive system. The incentives we propose do not
rule out publishing the names of review authors. We propose instead listing, for
each publication venue, both the top papers, and the top reviewers as determined
by the total of their review bonuses, allowing users of a Web interface to search
both papers, and reviewers. Post-publication peer review has also been advocated,
on similar grounds as [DSdA11, Kri12], in [Hun12, Her12, dS13]. Even the popu-
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lar press has engaged in the discussion [Mar14], with the CEO of Academia.edu2
mentioning the possibility of gathering reputation points from reviews.
The idea of evaluating scientific proposals via crowdsourcing reviews and rat-
ings has been proposed as a method for adjudicating telescope time, a central issue
in Astronomy [MS09], as well as in the evaluation of some National Science Foun-
dation proposals [NSF13].
ArXiv overlay journals are gaining momentum in several scientific disciplines,
including math, physics, and computer science [Gib16]. While their papers are
publicly available even before acceptance, their selection process follows the tra-
ditional peer review model of printed journals. In the words of Timothy Gowers,
Fields medalist and managing editor of the arXiv overlay journal Discrete Analy-
sis, “our journal is very conventional [...] But if the model becomes widespread,
then I personally would very much like to see more-radical ideas tried out as
well” [Bal15].
Other organizations are indeed pursuing more radical ideas: ScienceOpen3
publishes articles online under an open-access model and encourages post-
publication peer reviews, which include a numerical score. Reviews are publicly
attributed to their authors and even assigned a DOI. On the other hand, reviewers
do not accrue a numerical reputation for their efforts. Similarly to [Kri12], the
incentive for the reviewers consists in having a public collection of their reviews.
O’Peer4 is a proof-of-concept website where authors-reviewers accrue reputa-
tion (called credibility) according to both their publication record and the quality
of their reviews.
An incentive system that shares many of the design goals with the one we
propose for TrueReview has been proposed by Bhattacharjee and Goel [BG07] in
their work on incentives for robust ranking in online search. In the [BG07] pro-
posal, users can place tokens on items in order to place wagers on the quality of the
items, much as people can bet on horses at races. If the ratio between the qualities
of two items is different from the ratio between the token amounts, an arbitra-
tion opportunity arises, and a user can move a token from the over-rated item to
the under-rated one and gain reputation (an operation that is roughly equivalent to
betting a negative dollar on a horse and a positive dollar on another, if negative
bets were allowed). The incentive scheme is truthful, as the incentive is to bring
token counts in direct proportionality with qualities, and it also promotes informa-
tiveness, as the biggest arbitration opportunities occur for the papers that are most
under-valued. We made various attempts at adapting [BG07] for post-publication
2http://www.academia.edu
3http://www.scienceopen.com
4http://opeer.org
7
review, before finally opting for the grade-based scheme we propose for TrueRe-
view. The main problem we encountered is the slow start in properly ranking new
papers. When a paper is added, initially it has no tokens. If users can place or
move one token at a time, a good paper will require many reviews to receive a
proper ranking; if users can move many tokens at once, the vandalism of a single
user can cause considerable damage. Another issue was that the truthfulness and
innovativeness incentives are tied together by the arbitration opportunity, and their
strengths cannot be independently tuned. Ultimately, we felt that the approach pro-
posed in this paper was more flexible and allowed us to better control vandalism.
We can independently tune the truthfulness and informativeness incentives, and we
can adopt a number of aggregation strategies for reviews.
Another related line of inquiry focuses on eliciting honest feedback in the
absence of ground truth. Miller et al. [MRZ05] show that a simple scheme
based on proper scoring rules [Coo91] induces reviewers to provide their hon-
est opinion (similarly to our Theorem 1). Along the same line, Jurca and Falt-
ings [JF09] study scoring systems that are resistant to collusions, whereas Dasgupta
and Ghosh [DG13] consider the scenario in which reviewers can strategically cal-
ibrate the amount of effort spent for a review. None of these works model the
selection of items by reviewers, which is instead one of our main concerns.
The idea of validating assertions by considering them wagers on future value,
and rewarding thus their accuracy, is the principle at the basis of prediction markets
[WZ04, TT12]. The arbitration opportunities in prediction markets are in fact con-
ceptually similar to those in [BG07], except that by having real money involved,
the possibility for vandalism is virtually eliminated. Indeed, the stock market of-
fers a model for crowdsourcing valuations that both is truthful, and that offers a
prize for informativeness. However, the full working of the market (including the
put and call options that are important in betting on future valuations) are vastly
more complex than the simple mechanism we presented in this paper, and arguably
over-complicated for the task at hand.
There has been much work on peer evaluation, in classroom settings [Geh00,
Geh01, Rob01, STOA13] and in MOOCs [PHC+13]. In a classroom or MOOC
setting, however, the focus is on obtaining precise and fair evaluations, rather than
on incentives to select the items (papers, or homework submissions) to review. This
because in educational settings, students are usually compelled to perform the peer
reviews and evaluations as part of their class work. Furthermore, as homework
submissions share all the same topic, the review assignment can be (and usually,
is) performed automatically, again obviating the need for an informative incentive
system.
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4 The TrueReview Incentive System for Reviewers
The crucial challenge for post-publication review consists in ensuring that papers
receive adequate reviews and precise evaluations. There are many mechanisms for
ensuring that the set of potential reviewers is capable of writing useful reviews:
they can be invited to review, or the privilege of reviewing can be granted automat-
ically to people who have successfully published previously in the same venues.
The basic user action in TrueReview consists in a user choosing a paper, and
providing both a written review, and a numerical rating for the paper. The ratings
are then aggregated in a single rating for the whole paper. TrueReview rewards the
author of a review with a review “bonus”. In each publication venue, reviewers will
be listed according to the total of the bonuses they received: we hope this visibility
will provide incentive to review.
The incentive scheme used for assigning the review bonuses should be truth-
ful: the strategy for users to maximize their bonuses for each review should be to
express their honest opinion about the paper. Furthermore, the incentive scheme
should be informative: it should prize new relevant information over repetition of
already-known information. For instance, it should value the first review on a paper
more than a review confirming the consensus opinion on a paper that has already
been reviewed many times. Among papers having the same number of reviews, an
informative incentive scheme should value reviews that express opinions different
from the consensus, and that will turn out to be correct, more than reviews that are
simply confirming the current consensus. Informative incentive schemes lead to a
quick convergence to the true valuation for all papers.
4.1 Informativeness and Accuracy of a Review
We introduce an incentive system for reviewers that is both truthful and informa-
tive. Consider the sequence of ratings x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn that have been assigned,
in chronological order, to a given paper, where x0 is the default rating that is as-
signed by the system to every paper who is added to the system, as a starting point.
To define the bonus Bi for the author of rating xi, for 0 < i < n, let
qpasti = avg{x0, x1, . . . , xi−1}
qfuturei = avg{xi+1, xi+2, . . . , xn}
be the averages of the ratings preceding and following xi, respectively. Let L be
the quadratic loss function, defined by L(a, b) = (a− b)2. We define the accuracy
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loss and informativeness of the rating xi as follows:
Informativeness: δi = L(q
past
i , q
future
i ) (1)
Accuracy loss: θi = L(xi, q
future
i ) (2)
To reward reviewers which are both informative and accurate, we let the review
bonus bi be:
bi = δi · fSα,M (θi) (3)
where fSα,M is a sigmoidal function parameterized by a parameter α > 0, and by
the maximum rating M that can be given to a paper (see Figure 1). The smaller α
is, the stronger the incentive for accuracy is. The sigmoidal function is such that
fSα,M (0) = 1, and f
S
α,M (M
2) = 0, so that perfectly accurate reviewers will get
their full bonus, and reviewers with the maximum possible value M2 of accuracy
loss will not get any bonus.
0
1
M2θi
fS0.2,M (θi)
fS1,M (θi)
fS5,M (θi)
Figure 1: Three instances of fSα,M (x), for α = 0.2, α = 1 and α = 5.
The informativeness, accuracy loss, and bonus defines by (1)–(3) have a num-
ber of important properties.
Informativeness provide an incentive to select papers whose current evaluation
is most different from what the future consensus will be. Crucially, the informa-
tiveness depends on the previous and future ratings of the paper, but not on the
rating xi assigned by the reviewer under consideration. Thus, once the reviewer
selects a paper to review, informativeness plays no further role, and the bonus de-
pends entirely on the accuracy loss. This decouples choice of paper from accuracy,
and will be crucial in proving that the incentive scheme is truthful.
The accuracy loss is computed by comparing the user’s rating only with future
valuations. This eliminates any incentive to provide a valuation that is similar to
the known past ones, against the user’s true belief about the paper. Consider, for
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instance, an alternative definition where qfuture represents the average of all valu-
ations. If the user has some prior knowledge about the typical number of reviews
a paper is likely to receive, and most of those have already been written, then the
user would be able to achieve high accuracy just by providing a rating that is the
average of the past ones.
A consequence of our choice of incentive scheme is that we reward users who
discover new information, and present it convincingly in their reviews. For such
users, the score they propose is different from past ones, and influences all future
ratings. The informativeness will be high, due to the difference between past and
future ratings, and the accuracy will not suffer from the difference between the
score and previous ratings. Notice how this latter property would not hold if we
included all ratings in the computation of qfuture .
4.2 Truthfulness
Our incentive schemes are not truthful in the strong sense that it is a weakly dom-
inating strategy for players to give ratings that reflect their true opinion of the pa-
per. There are many collusion schemes that form Nash equilibria where deviating
reduces the bonus: for instance, the one where all reviewers provide the same, con-
stant, rating. Since there is no ground truth for paper quality independent from
reviewer-provided ratings, the inability to ensure that truthful strategies are weakly
dominating is unavoidable: reviewers could agree to review a paper as if it were
another one; there is nothing intrinsic that ties the reviewer behavior to the paper
being reviewed that can be used in the mechanism design. The best we can show
is that under some conditions, being truthful is a strict Nash equilibrium, that is, a
Nash equilibrium from which deviating is not favorable.
The rating process can be modeled as a Bayesian game [OR94], in which each
user i can observe the ratings x1, x2, . . . , xi−1 given by previous users to a given
paper, as well as their own belief yi about the paper quality qtrue . On the basis
of these observations, user i must in turn provide a rating xi for the paper. In
formulating our results, we assume that the private estimate yi of the quality of the
paper available to player i is unbiased, and that estimates of different reviewers
are uncorrelated. The assumption that the user estimates are not overall biased is
unavoidable: there is no way to distinguish between a paper of quality qtrue , and
a paper of quality qtrue − ∆ for some ∆ > 0, which all users over-appreciate on
average by an amount ∆. Put another way, there is no way to differentiate good
papers from papers that only seem good to all users: the two notions coincide in
our system.
In the following theorems, we use the fact that the bonus received by the i-
th user is a combination bi = F (θi, δi), where F is monotonically decreasing in
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θi and monotonically increasing in δi. As δi is fully determined by the choice of
paper, to reason about truthflness, we can reason on the θi component only.
Our first result concerns reviewers who rate papers without access to other re-
views. In this case, it is easy to show that being truthful is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Assume all users form statistically uncorrelated and unbiased esti-
mates of the quality of each paper, and assume that users enter their review with-
out being able to read other reviews first. Then, the strategy profile under which
all users rate the paper with their quality estimates is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let 0 < i < n, and assume xj = yj for 0 < j ≤ n, j 6= i, so that all
users except the i-th rate papers with their individual estimate, and consider the
point of view of the i-th user. The user must minimize θi. As the private estimates
{yj}0<j≤n are uncorrelated, the expected value of θi can be written as the sum of
two variances vi + vf , where vi is the variance of xi with respect to the true value
qtrue of the paper, and vf is the variance of q
future
i with respect to q
true . As user i
has no influence over vf , the user must minimize vi, and this entails voting the best
estimate yi of qtrue available to the player, so that xi = yi.
We can extend this result to the case in which reviewers can read previous
reviews, and adjust their submitted ratings according to the previous ratings for
the paper. Consider again users 1, 2, 3, . . ., with private uncorrelated estimates
y1, y2, y3, . . ., whose expected value is the quality qtrue of the paper. We assume
for simplicity that these private estimates all have the same variance v (the general
case is similar, and can be obtained by weighing each estimate with the inverse of
its variance). In a truthful strategy profile, each user will report the most precise
estimates that can be computed from the private information and from the previous
ratings. Thus, user 1 will report x1 = y1, user 2 will report x2 = (x1 + y2)/2 =
(y1 + y2)/2, and in general, user n will report (n − 1)xn−1/n + yn/n = (y1 +
y2 + · · ·+yn)/n. The next theorem shows that deviating from this truthful strategy
yields a lower bonus, so that the truthful strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. If reviewers have access to previous reviews, and if their private esti-
mates are uncorrelated, being truthful is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider users 1, 2, . . . , n, n + 1, with uncorrelated private estimates yi.
We show that it is optimal for user n to be truthful; the general case for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
is similar but leads to more complicated notation. If user n + 1 plays truthfully,
while player n deviates from the truthful amount by ∆, we have:
xn =
n− 1
n
xn−1 +
yn
n
+ ∆ xn+1 =
n
n+ 1
xn +
yn+1
n+ 1
.
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The expected loss E
[
(xn − xn+1)2
]
is thus equal to
E
[( n− 1
n(n+ 1)
xn−1 +
yn
n(n+ 1)
+
∆
n+ 1
− yn+1
n+ 1
)2]
. (4)
Noting that E [xn−1] = E [yn] = E [yn+1] = qtrue , we have that the coefficient of
∆ in the expansion of (4) is
qtrue
(n+ 1)2
[n− 1
n
+
1
n
− 1
]
= 0 .
Thus, (4) depends on ∆ only via ∆2/(n + 1)2. Since xn−1, yn, and yn−1 are
mutually uncorrelated, we obtain from (4):
E
[
(xn − xn+1)2
]
=
v
n(n+ 1)
+
∆2
(n+ 1)2
,
where v is the variance of one of the individual estimates yi. Thus, user n incurs
minimum loss when ∆ = 0, showing that deviating from truthful behavior reduces
the review bonus. Intuitively, any variation from the truth by one user only partially
influences later users, raising the loss of the deviating user.
5 Simulations
We have shown in the previous section that the accuracy part of the incentive en-
sures that, once a reviewer has chosen a paper to evaluate, it is in her best interest
to evaluate it honestly. It remains to show that the informativeness term of the in-
centive encourages users to choose papers in a way that benefits the overall quality
of the ranking. We provide evidence in this direction through a set of simulations
in which a population of 1000 users evaluates a collection of 1000 papers.
We assume that each paper has an intrinsic quality qtrue which represents our
ground truth. At any given time, the system attributes a current rating to each
paper. Such rating starts at zero and is updated as the arithmetic average of the
grades provided by the reviewers (including the initial default value of zero).
The reputation resulting from a review is defined by the bonus (3). The core
component of the simulation is its user model, dictating how simulated users
choose a paper to review and a grade for it. In particular, simulated users hold
certain beliefs about the papers, which allow them to estimate the expected reputa-
tion boost deriving from reviewing a certain paper. Supported by the observations
in the previous sections, we assume that users grade papers truthfully, i.e., accord-
ing to the best reconstruction allowed by the model.
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5.1 User Models
We stipulate that each user is interested in a random sample of 100 papers out
of the total 1000. On each of those papers, the user initially holds the following
beliefs: the paper quality z and the corresponding expected error σ. One can think
of 1σ as the competence of the user on that paper, of which the user is self-aware.
Moreover, users are aware of the average error σ¯ among all users and all papers.
Next, we describe how the above parameters are sampled. The true value qtrue
is sampled for each paper out of a normal distribution. Then, each user is attributed
a typical error σt out of a distribution with mean σ¯; the typical error indicates the
“overall competence” of the user for the papers under consideration. The paper-
specific error σ is sampled from a distribution with mean σt. Finally, the perceived
paper quality z is sampled out of a normal distribution with mean qtrue and stan-
dard deviation σ (denoted by N (qtrue , σ)). Thus, we model users of varying de-
grees of average competence, and with each a set of papers that they might consider
reviewing.
We present results for two user models. The models coincide on the original
beliefs held by the users about the papers, but differ in the way users take into
account previous reviews received by a paper. In the first user model, users grade
according to their belief, without taking into account previous reviews. In the
second user model, users revise their belief to take into account the grades in the
previous reviews and their supposed accuracy. In both models, each user starts
with the belief (z, σ) described above, for each paper in which she is interested.
First user model. In the first user model, reviewers believe their quality estimate
z to be the best estimate for the future consensus grade assigned by the system to
that paper. Accordingly, accuracy is simply estimated as σ2 and informativeness
as (qpast − z)2, where qpast is the average of the previous grades, leading to the
reputation boost estimate
(qpast − z)2 · fSα,M (σ2).
The above estimate is used to choose which paper to review. Once a given paper is
chosen to be reviewed, it will receive grade z. This user model is consistent with
the assumptions of Theorem 1.
Second user model. In our second user model, users look at previous reviews
to reconstruct via Bayesian inference the most likely grade for a paper. Based on
these beliefs and taking into account previous reviews, users estimate the reputation
boost they may receive from evaluating a given paper. Consider a paper with n
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previous reviews and current evaluation qpast . Since a user does not hold a specific
belief on the competence of previous reviewers, she assumes they all share the same
error σ¯. Then, in this user model, the best quality estimate qˆ and the corresponding
error σˆ are obtained by Bayesian inference with prior N (z, σ) and observation
qpast with likelihood N (qtrue , σ¯√
n
). The likelihood follows from assuming that
previous reviewers adopted a similar Bayesian inference procedure, starting from
statistically independent private beliefs. Accordingly, the accuracy term of the
incentive is estimated as σˆ2 and informativeness as (qpast − qˆ)2, leading to the
reputation boost estimate
(qpast − qˆ)2 · fSα,M (σˆ2).
Once the user chooses a paper, he will enter the grade qˆ for it. This user model is
consistent with the assumptions of Theorem 2, except that here each user is aware
of its own variance (σ) and assumes that all previous reviewers have the same
variance σ¯. The same-variance assumption for previous reviewers is motivated by
the fact that we envision reviews to appear anonymous, so that users cannot infer
the variance of a review from the identity of its author.
5.2 Choice of paper to review
At each round, a user is selected in round-robin fashion and performs a truthful
review of a paper. We compare three different scenarios in which users choose
which paper to review in the following ways:
• Random: uniformly at random among the papers known to the user.
• Selfish: the user chooses the paper that maximizes the estimated reputation
boost, as described in the user model, with a varying value of α.
• Accuracy: the user chooses the paper that minimizes the estimated accuracy
loss.
• Informativeness: the user chooses the paper that maximizes the estimated
informativeness loss.
• Optimal: the user chooses the paper that maximizes global loss decrease,
assuming that she knows the real quality of all papers, but still grades ac-
cording to her beliefs.
The “random” criterion is used to measure the performance of our incentive system
compared to a system where users, lacking incentives, pick the paper they wish to
review uniformly at random. The “accuracy” and “informativeness” criteria are
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used to show that an appropriate combination of these two (a.k.a. selfish choice) is
more effective than either of them separately. The “optimal” criterion is deliber-
ately irrealistic and meant to serve as a reference for the fastest possible global loss
decrease compatible with user beliefs about paper quality.
5.3 Performance Measures
Our first performance measure is the global loss of the current quality estimates,
computed as the sum over all papers of the squared difference between the current
paper quality estimate and the paper intrinsic quality qtrue .
To illustrate how more expert reviewers receive more reputation (total review
bonus points), we also report in Figures 6 and 7 the Pearson and Spearman cor-
relations between user competence (the user-typical error σt discussed above) and
the reputation at the end of the experiment. Additionally, the fourth column in Fig-
ures 6 and 7 reports the expected error incurred by a user when grading a paper,
relative to the typical error of that user. A value close to 1, such as the one obtained
by the random choice criterion, implies that users select papers independently of
their specific competences. On the contrary, the lower the value the more users are
choosing the papers they are more familiar with. Since users in practice are likely
to prefer those papers anyway, we see a low value in that column as a desideratum
for our incentive scheme. The relative error values are averaged over rounds and
data sets, and the last column in our tables displays the standard deviation over data
sets.
5.4 Results
We simulated the behavior of 1000 users evaluating a set of 1000 papers. Each user
holds beliefs on a random subset of 100 papers that the user is willing to review.
We simulate 5000 reviewing rounds. We repeated each simulation run 10 times, in
order to measure the standard deviation of the results across the runs.
5.4.1 Results for First User Model
Figure 2 shows the value of the global loss, relative to the initial global loss, when
paper choice is performed according to the five criteria from Section 5.2. The first
column of the table in Figure 6 reports the loss after 3000 reviews. The other
columns contain the Pearson and Spearman correlations between user competence
and reputation, and the user propensity for reviewing papers on which they are
most proficient.
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Figure 2: Relative global loss in the first user model.
The relative global loss curve shows that the selfish choice, for α ∈ {0.1, 1},
performs very well and close to the optimal choice of papers, especially in the first
1000 rounds of the experiments. In fact, a closer inspection reveals that, when pa-
pers have the default starting score of 0 and no reviews yet, users simply choose
papers with high perceived quality and no reviews, in order to reap a large infor-
mativeness bonus. Hence, at the beginning many papers go from the default score
of 0 to approximately M2 , justifying the initial steep decline in global loss.
Then, consider the curve for the “informativeness” choice criterion. After the
first 1000 rounds, when the above phenomenon leads to a near-optimal perfor-
mance, the curve is essentially flat. Indeed, when users are only incentivized to
provide informative grades, they will preferably select papers for which they have
a very extreme opinion (very low or very high), leading to oscillation of paper
scores, rather than convergence to the true value.
Notice that the global loss curve for α = 1 is very close to the one for the
“informativeness” choice criterion. This is due to the fact that the sigmoid fS1,M (x)
stays very close to 1 for relatively large values of x. Roughly speaking, the sig-
moid “forgives” large accuracy errors. Hence, even if a user expects a significant
accuracy loss, she can count on a reward almost equal to the expected informative-
ness bonus. Specifically, in our experiments we have M = 10 (grades between 0
and 10) and users have a maximum standard deviation of 5. So, their estimate for
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Figure 3: Relative global loss in the second user model.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of grades per paper in the first user model.
The labels 11+ and 21+ stand for the intervals [11, 20], [21,∞), respectively.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the number of grades per paper in the second user model.
The labels 11+ and 21+ stand for the intervals [11, 20], [21,∞), respectively.
choice criterion loss Pearson Spearman rel. error rel. error std. dev.
random 0.24 -0.005 -0.006 0.999 0.003
accuracy 0.17 0.011 0.011 0.536 0.003
informativeness 0.13 0.069 0.063 1.049 0.003
optimal 0.00 0.015 0.014 0.972 0.003
selfish, α = 0.1 0.08 0.162 0.161 0.719 0.002
selfish, α = 1 0.13 0.070 0.070 1.030 0.004
Figure 6: Summary data for the first user model. The columns contain: the relative
global loss after 3000 reviews; the Pearson and Spearman correlations between
competence and reputation after 5000 reviews; the average relative error (defined
in Section “Performance Measures”) and its standard deviation across 10 data sets.
choice criterion loss Pearson Spearman rel. error rel. error std. dev.
random 0.30 -0.002 -0.004 1.002 0.004
accuracy 0.79 0.323 0.228 0.944 0.003
informativeness 0.07 0.020 0.020 0.769 0.002
optimal 0.04 -0.028 -0.030 0.806 0.004
selfish, α = 0.1 0.08 0.157 0.155 0.740 0.004
selfish, α = 1 0.07 0.070 0.067 0.782 0.004
Figure 7: Summary data for the second user model. The columns have the same
interpretation as Figure 6.
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the accuracy loss is in the range [0, 25], which corresponds to very limited reward
penalties (fS1,10(25) u 0.94).
On the other hand, when α = 0.1 even a small accuracy loss incurs a signif-
icant penalty on the reward, so the two components of the incentive are properly
balanced. The global loss curve is initially steep and competitively positioned w.r.t.
both the “optimal” curve and the curve based on accuracy alone. This is confirmed
by Figure 6, reporting the relative error 0.719 for this case and a moderate correla-
tion of 0.161 between competence and final reputation, higher than all other cases.
Summarizing, data from this user model suggests that a choice of α close to 0.1
might be appropriate to the parameters of our populations.
5.4.2 Results for Second User Model
Figures 3 and 7 show the relative global loss and the other performance measures
for this model.
It may appear surprising that the choice based on accuracy alone performs even
worse than the random choice. Indeed, when accuracy is the only incentive, users
tend to focus on papers that have already received many reviews, because their
quality can be more accurately predicted on the basis of the previous ratings. This
creates a perverse incentive, in which the papers whose quality is best known draw
the most evaluations. Figure 5 confirms that in that case more than 50 papers re-
ceive a very large amount of ratings, whereas 700 papers are completely neglected.
The distribution of the number of grades per paper becomes much more balanced
with the selfish choice and α = 0.1, when the informativeness term mitigates the
above issue.
Similarly to the other user model, our incentives with α = 0.1 display the best
overall performance, with 8% global loss after 3000 reviews, positive correlation
between competence and reputation, and low relative error of 0.74, proving a clear
bias for choosing papers on which the user is particularly competent.
In practice, this set of experiments suggests that the proposed incentive scheme
may provide strong advantages, compared to rewarding accuracy alone, once it has
been properly tuned to the characteristics of the user and paper populations.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3, we note that even in the optimal case, the global
loss decreases faster for the first user model than for the second one. This can
be explained by noting that in the first user model, users grade papers according
to their individually-formed opinion, without access to other user’s reviews. If n
users provide grades for a paper, and the grades are then averaged, the individual
opinions of each user account for 1/n of the average, which is optimal lacking
information on the accuracy of individual users. In the second user model, instead,
users use Bayesian inference to improve the accuracy of their estimate on the basis
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of reviews of previous users. As a consequence, the individual estimate qˆi of the
i-th user accounts only for 1/i of the grade provided by user i (assuming constant
variances), and for 1n ·
∑n
k=i
1
k of the complete average grade. This non-uniform
weighing of the individually formed opinions is not optimal, and slows loss de-
crease.
6 Discussion
In this white paper, we advocate a shift from pre to post-publication peer review
for scientific papers. The chief benefit of post-publication peer review is the more
timely circulation of scientific ideas, which can be shared as soon as the authors
decide to publish them. The key to a successful process of post-publication peer
review consists in creating venues where authors are willing to post their papers
for review, and where reviewers are incentivized to do useful and fair review work.
To facilitate this, we are proposing to create a tool, TrueReview, in support of
post-publication peer review. TrueReview will allow people to set up new venues
where papers can be submitted (for example, corresponding to conferences or spe-
cial topics), as well as venues that index papers appearing in open-access venues
such as arXiv. To encourage useful and accurate reviews, TrueReview will list with
similar prominence both papers and reviewers: the papers will be ranked according
to their quality, as assessed by the reviewers, and the reviewers will be ranked in
order of the total review bonus they have accrued. The review bonus thus works as
an incentive for reviewers.
We propose to award review bonus according to a combination of review ac-
curacy and informativeness.
The accuracy measures the precision of a review’s evaluation, in light of future
evaluations. Judging a review only in view of future ones is instrumental in creating
a truthful incentive for reviewers, where expressing their own best judgement on
the paper’s quality is an optimal strategy. Furthermore, measuring the accuracy of
a review by comparing it with future reviews only rewards people who discover
significant facts about papers, explain them in their review, and thereby influence
future reviews.
The informativeness of a review is a measure of how much the future evaluation
of a paper differs from the current one. Awarding a bonus for informativeness thus
creates an incentive for reviewers to select papers who have received no or few re-
views, or whose reviews are grossly imprecise. As the informativeness of a review
is unrelated to the rating expressed in the review itself, including informativeness
in the bonus does not alter the truthful nature of the incentive schemes.
We combine the accuracy and informativeness schemes in a multiplicative fash-
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ion, such that reviewers need to be both accurate and informative in order to obtain
a bonus. This prevents lazy review strategies, such as picking papers with a large
number of reviews and simply restating the consensus opinion on these papers
(accurate but not informative), or picking new papers and just entering a random
review (informative but not accurate).
We have experimented with two users models: one in which users base their
review on their opinion only, and another in which they examine and account for
previous ratings, before forming their opinion of the paper’s quality. For both user
models, our experiments show that the review bonus that combines both informa-
tiveness and accuracy is superior to considering either informativeness or accuracy
alone, and is superior also to offering no specific bonus, and resorting on simpler
methods such as simply counting how many reviews each user has provided.
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